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Introduction
I.
Almost half a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
"there are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's
A similar
power to expropriate the property of aliens."'
of
question
the
to
regard
observation could be made today with
which types of government measures constitute acts of "indirect
expropriation" of foreign investment requiring compensation
under international investment agreements (hereinafter "IIAs").
The debate has focused largely on the appropriate standard for
determining when regulatory measures that adversely affect the
value of an investment but do not actually transfer its ownership or
control to the government may nonetheless entitle the investor to
compensation from the host government. 2
The expropriation provisions of HAs-which include both
bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter "BITs") and the
investment chapters of free trade agreements (hereinafter
"FTAs")-typically require compensation for both direct and
"indirect" expropriation. The analysis of whether a regulatory
measure results in an indirect expropriation is primarily concerned
with the extent to which the measure adversely affects an
investment, an approach known as the "sole effect doctrine." 4
Another provision in HAs has been interpreted to grant
similar-and arguably greater-protection from regulatory
measures that adversely affect the value of foreign investments.
Many IIAs contain language guaranteeing foreign investors a right

I Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
2

See infra Part II.B.

See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
1, Nov. 4, 2005 ("Neither Party may expropriate or
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 6,
nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures
equivalent to expropriationor nationalization.")(emphasis added).
4 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES-STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 325-26 (2009).
No matter how the [indirect] expropriation is described, the international law
looks to the effect of the government measures on the investor's property. This
approach . . . has been referred to as the "sole effect doctrine" because the focus
of the analysis is the effect of the state measure on the investment.
Id.
3
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to "fair and equitable treatment" as an element of the minimum

standard of treatment.' This language has been interpreted by
tribunals to include a right to a "stable and predictable regulatory
environment" that does not frustrate investors' expectations
concerning the profitability or value of their investments. 6
The right under IIAs to compensation for regulations that
adversely affect the value of an investment is widely portrayed as

reflecting the relevant standard of protection under customary
international law (hereinafter "CIL") regardless of whether the
government has actually acquired any economic right or interest
for its own use.' Yet, despite the significant debate over the scope
and contours of this right,' there has been surprisingly little
attention paid to the fundamental question of whether such a right
can be demonstrated to exist at all under the traditional definition
of CIL-i.e., is it the general and consistent practice of states,
based on a perception of legal obligation (opinio juris), to
compensate investors for regulatory measures that have some
requisite level of adverse effect on the value of their investments? 9
One obvious source of state practice can be found in the
domestic standards of protection for property rights that are
An
applicable to both domestic and foreign investors.o
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 See infra Part II.B.
7 This is reasonably clear at least with regard to the standard for indirect
expropriation. There is less agreement on the relationship between CIL and the standard
for fair and equitable treatment. See infra Part IV.C.
8 See infra Part 111.
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice followed by [states] from a sense of legal obligation.").
10 Int'l L. Ass'n Comm. of Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l L., Final Report
(London
Conf.,
2000),
http://www.ilaCommittee,
at
18,
of the
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30, [hereinafter ILA Report]. "The practice of
States and international tribunals shows that a State's legislation . . . including its
constitution . ..

can . . . be regarded as a manifestation of its practice." Id. See also

Moshe Hirsch, Sources of International Investment Law 10 (International Law
Association Study Group on the Role of Soft Law Instruments in International
No.
05-11,
2011),
available at
Law,
Working
Paper
Investment
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1892564 ("international tribunals
often consider various non-physical acts as '[state] practice.' Such acts include . . .
domestic legislation."); Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
17, 54 n. 127 (2009) (noting that examining relevant domestic law for evidence of state
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examination of relevant domestic law, however, indicates that
there is no general and consistent practice in this area." The issue
of whether property owners should receive compensation under
domestic law for regulatory measures that significantly decrease
the value of their property has received the most attention in the
context of the "regulatory takings" debate in the United States,
where a relatively narrow right to compensation is recognized that
primarily addresses land use regulations that destroy all or nearly
all of the value of real property.12 Some developed countries
similarly recognize a right to compensation for certain measures
(again, principally in the context of land use regulation), but the
approaches vary significantly." Developing countries, in contrast,
are more likely to categorically reject the concept of regulatory
takings.14 Accordingly, there does not appear to be support in state
practice giving rise to CIL "is, of course, sanctioned by long-standing practice.").
See also F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572,
583 (1960) ("No state can be fixed with responsibility for expropriation unless the act
complained of can fairly be said to involve the taking of property within the meaning
attributed to that conception by the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. These principles cannot be ascertained otherwise than by comparative law.").
Mann refers to the conceptually distinct category of "general principles of law" rather
than CIL. He appears, however, to view general principles of law as performing a
function similar to CIL in establishing international legal norms, rather than the merely
"supplementary" role with which they are usually ascribed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) ("General principles
common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary
law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international
law where appropriate."). Rudolph Dolzer has similarly argued for reference to general
principles of law derived from domestic law as a means of identifying the standard for
indirect expropriation. See Rudolph Dolzer, Indirect Expropriationof Alien Property, 1
ISCID REV. 41, 59-64 (1986) ("[I]n the absence of relevant primary sources of law, a
secondary source must come into play . . . . [General] principles [of law] must be

searched for and established on the basis of parallel notions and rules in domestic legal
orders.").
II Rudolph Dolzer reached a similar conclusion after reviewing various other
sources of state practice and the decisions of international tribunals, observing that
"[c]lear state practice [regarding indirect expropriation] which would permit
generalizations cannot be discerned; opinio juris is even more difficult to detect."
Dolzer, supra note 10, at 58.
12 See infra Part III.A.I.
13 See Regulatory Takings and the Role of Comparative Research, in RACHELLE
ALTERMAN ET AL., TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAND
USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS 13-14 (Rachelle Alterman ed. 2010).
14 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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practice for a CIL right to compensation for regulatory
expropriations based upon their adverse effects on the value of
investments and without regard to whether the government has
actually acquired ownership or control of the asset.
Section II of this article provides a brief overview of the
arbitral jurisprudence on regulatory expropriation under both the
indirect expropriation and the fair and equitable treatment
provisions of HAs. Section III examines the domestic practice of
nations with regard to regulatory takings doctrine with a particular
emphasis on the major capital exporting states in North America
and Western Europe. Section IV discusses several potential
alternative arguments for a right under international law to
compensation for regulatory expropriations and concludes that
none of them are persuasive.
II.
Regulatory Expropriation Doctrine and IIAs
The debate over the standard for regulatory expropriations
under IIAs has, understandably, focused on how to interpret
"indirect" expropriation provisions." Yet as discussed below, a
similar and apparently more expansive regulatory takings doctrine
has been developing under the fair and equitable treatment
component of the minimum standard of treatment.
A. Indirect Expropriation

There is broad agreement that the focus of the inquiry
concerning indirect expropriation should be on the effect of a
measure on an investment,16 although tribunals interpreting HAs
have failed to articulate a clear or consistent standard concerning
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 As an alternative to the sole effect test, some tribunals have indicated that the
adverse effects on the investment must be evaluated against the governmental interests
involved to determine the relevant measure's "proportionality."
This approach,
however, still turns in large part on the regulatory measure's impact on the investment.
See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of the Tribunal, 1 122 (May 29, 2003),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServIet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) (noting that the proportionality test requires an evaluation of "whether [the relevant]
actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby
and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality").
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the level of adverse economic effect a regulatory measure must
have to be considered expropriatory." Some arbitral decisions
have suggested that a measure can constitute an act of indirect
expropriation if it has an adverse effect on the value of an
investment that is merely "significant"" or "substantial."" Other
tribunals have indicated that a regulatory measure must result in
something approaching the complete destruction of the value of an
investment for it to be considered an indirect expropriation.20
There is also some support for the position that there is a
police power exception to the compensation requirement-i.e.,
that a nondiscriminatory regulatory measure cannot constitute an
act of expropriation regardless of its adverse economic impact.2'

17

See Jack Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubins, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed

Case: Context

and Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

LAW

AND

ARBITRATION, LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 621 (Todd Weiler ed. 2005) ("The international

threshold for compensation is somewhere between total deprivation of ownership rights
and mere interference."); Catherine Yannaca-Small, "Indirect Expropriation" and the
"Right to Regulate" in InternationalInvestment Law 5 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and
Dev. Working Papers on International
Investment No. 2004/4, 2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf ("There is no generally accepted and
clear definition of the concept of indirect expropriation and what distinguishes it from
non-compensable regulation.").
18 See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1,
Award
of
the
Tribunal,
1
103
(Aug.
30,
2000),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) ("[E]xpropriation ... includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings
of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour
[sic] of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property.") (emphasis added).
19 See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 1 102 (NAFTA Arbitration
Trib.
2000),
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopelnterimMeritsAward.pdf
("under international law, expropriation requires a 'substantial deprivation"').
20 See Tecnicas Medioambientales 116 (indirect expropriation occurs when "the
economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by
the [government measure] have been neutralized or destroyed."); see also Andrew
Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20:1
ICSID Review-FILJ 4 (2005) ("[U]nder the 'orthodox approach' [a regulatory]
expropriation occurs when a foreign investor is deprived of the use, benefit, management
or enjoyment of all or substantially all of its investment.").
21 See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, Part IV, Ch. D, 1 7 (NAFTA
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This appears, however, to be a minority view.2 2
The concept of indirect expropriation under investment
agreements applies to a broad range of government actions,
including not only regulatory measures but taxation as well.23 The
scope of covered "investment" is similarly broad, and typically
covers not only property as defined under domestic law, but also a
wide range of economic interests resulting from the commitment
of capital to economic activity in the host state.2 4
Arbitration Trib. 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf ("[A]
non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with
due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by
the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment
that the government would refrain from such regulation."); see also Saluka Investments
BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 262 (UNCITRAL Arbitration
Trib.
2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SALCZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.pdf ("[T]he principle that a State does not commit
an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien
investor when it adopts general regulations that are 'commonly accepted as within the
police power of States' forms part of customary international law today.").
22 See Tecnicas Medioambientales 121:
[W]e find no principle stating that regulatory administrative actions are per se
excluded from the scope of the Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society
as a whole-such as environmental protection-particularly if the negative
economic impact of such actions on the financial position of the investor is
sufficient to neutralize in full the value, or economic or commercial use of its
investment without receiving any compensation whatsoever.
See also Pope & Talbot, 1 99 (arguing that "a blanket exception for regulatory measures
would create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation").
23 See generally Thomas W. Wllde & Abba Kolo, Taxation and Modern
Investment Treaties, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

347-52 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (describing recent arbitration decisions that
apply the concept of indirect expropriation to taxes).
24 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67, 80 (2005) ("Most BITs define the concept of investment broadly so as to include
various investment forms: tangible and intangible assets, property, and rights. Their
approach is to give the term 'investment' a broad, non-exclusive definition, recognizing
that investment forms are constantly evolving in response to the creativity of investors
and the rapidly changing world of international finance. The effect is to provide an
expanding umbrella of protection to investors and investments."); see also Ursula
Krienbaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and
InternationalInvestment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW,

LIBER AMICORUM Luzius WILDHABER 760 (Stephen Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007)
("When determining the existence of an 'investment,' tribunals have emphasized
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B. 'The Right to a "Stable andPredictableLegal
Environment" as an Element ofFairand Equitable
Treatment
In addition to indirect expropriation provisions, during the last
decade tribunals have also interpreted the minimum standard of
treatment articles of HAs to include a right to compensation in
some instances where government measures adversely affect the
value of a foreign investor's assets.25 Many IIAs define the
minimum standard of treatment to include a right to "fair and
equitable treatment."2 6 The right to fair and equitable treatment is
"the most relied upon and successful basis for [an investment]
treaty claim."27
Tribunals have interpreted this language as providing foreign

repeatedly that what mattered was not so much ownership of specific assets but rather
the combination of rights that were necessary for the economic activity at issue.").
Current United States practice takes a somewhat more constrained approach to the scope
of investment that may be the subject of an indirect expropriation claim. Although
recent U.S. IIAs contain typically broad definitions of investment that include, but are
not limited to, property they also include language limiting expropriation claims to
instances in which property has been adversely affected. See, e.g., United States-Peru
Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-137, 121 Stat. 1455
(2007), Annex 10-B, 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/peru-tpa/final-text, [hereinafter U.S.-Peru TPA] ("The Parties confirm their
shared understanding that . . . [aln action or a series of actions by a Party cannot
constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right
or property interest in an investment."). It remains to be seen, however, whether
tribunals will use domestic law to determine the scope of "property" that is covered
under these provisions, or how tribunals will differentiate between the terms "property
right" and "property interest."
25 See Newcombe, supra note 20, at 51 (describing the development of the right to
compensation).
26 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 5, T 1, Nov. 4, 2005 (Minimum Standard of Treatment)
("Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security.").
27 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ITA MONITOR No. I at 6 (2009), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf. Seven of the thirteen claims
based on fair and equitable treatment decided in 2008 were successful, as compared with
only two successful expropriation claims out of seven decided the same year. See id. at
6, 8-9.
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investors with a right to a "stable" legal and business environment

that does not "frustrate their legitimate expectations." 28 Although
there is some dispute as to whether this standard (or the right to
fair and equitable treatment in general) provides greater protection
than the minimum standard of treatment for aliens and their
investments under customary international law,29 tribunals have
generally taken the position that the right to a stable and
predictable business environment is consistent with the standard
28 See, e.g., Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA v. Repubic of
339 (Aug. 18, 2008),
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServIet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) ("[A] stable and predictable legal and business environment is considered an
essential element of the fair and equitable treatment standard."); PSEG Global, Inc. v.
240 (Jan. 19, 2007),
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) (the right to fair and equitable treatment includes the right to "a predictable and
stable environment [including] treatment that does not detract from the basic
expectations on the basis of which the foreign investor decided to make the investment")
(internal quotation marks omitted); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
131 (Oct. 3, 2006),
Decision on Liability,
Case No. ARB/02/1,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) ("the fair and equitable standard consists of the host State's consistent and
transparent behavior, free of ambiguity that involves the obligation to grant and maintain
a stable and predictable legal framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations of
the foreign investor."); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
2005),
12,
274
(May
Award,
ARB/01/8,
No.
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) ("There can be no doubt . . . that a stable legal and business environment is an
essential element of fair and equitable treatment."); see also Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, 191 (July 1,2004),
12 ICSID Rep. 94 (2007) (under fair and equitable treatment "there is certainly an
obligation not to alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has
been made"); Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
Award,
154 (May 23, 2003),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) (fair and equitable treatment requires the government "to act in a consistent manner,
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments").
29 See infra Part IV.C; see also Matthew C. Porterfield, An InternationalCommon
Law ofInvestor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 81-96 (2006).
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under CIL.30
This formulation of fair and equitable treatment functions as a
particularly broad version of regulatory takings doctrine: the
investor's "legitimate expectations" define the economic interests
that are entitled to protection from "frustration" or impairment by
regulatory or tax measures." Accordingly, changes in regulatory
or tax standards that affect the investor's expectations concerning
the value or profitability of the investment could be found to
breach the relevant standard of protection, even if the impairment
of the investment's value does not reach the level that the tribunal
determines is necessary to constitute an act of indirect
expropriation.
The tribunal's decision in LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine
Republic32 provides an example of the relatively low threshold for
30 See, e.g., CMS Gas 284 ("[T]he Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment
and its connection with the required stability and predictability of the business
environment, founded on solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different
from the international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.");
Occidental Exploration, 12 ICSD Rep. 190 ("[T]he Tribunal is of the opinion that in
the instant case the Treaty standard is not different from that required under [customary]
international law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business
framework of the investment."). But see Glamis Gold v. United States, ICSID Case,
619-22 (June 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow
Award,
"Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced
Search" hyperlink and enter Case No.) (holding that the CIL standard for fair and
equitable treatment protects only reasonable expectations that are based on specific
assurances made by the host country to induce the investment).
31 The prohibition on uncompensated expropriation has traditionally been
considered to be a component of the minimum standard of treatment under customary
international law. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 329-30 (2d ed. 2004). The interpretation of fair and equitable treatment as
providing a right to a stable and predictable legal environment, however, appears to have
developed independently, based on treaty text and citation to other arbitral decisions.
See Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, (August 30, 2000),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.). This was one of the first awards to adopt this approach to fair and equitable
treatment, and the tribunal cited language in NAFTA indicating that the agreement was
intended to increase transparency and cross-border investment in concluding that
NAFTA's fair and equitable treatment provision created a right to "a transparent and
70, 75predictable framework for . . . business planning and investment." See id. at
76, 99.
32 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability (Oct. 3 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
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establishing a violation of fair and equitable treatment as
compared with proving an indirect expropriation claim. The
tribunal rejected LG&E's claim that certain measures taken by
Argentina in response to its financial crisis-including changes in
the laws governing the rates charged to Argentine consumers of
gas provided by distribution companies in which LG&E had
invested-resulted in an indirect expropriation of LG&E's
investment.33 The tribunal noted that although LG&E's earnings
had been adversely affected, LG&E had still maintained its shares
in the company. Accordingly, "[w]ithout a permanent, severe
deprivation of LG&E's rights with regard to its investment, or
almost complete deprivation of the value of LG&E's
investment. . . these
circumstances
do not constitute
34
expropriation."
The tribunal, however, found that LG&E had
been denied its right to "the stability and predictability underlying
the standard of fair and equitable treatment."35
Similarly, the tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey36 indicated that
measures that failed to rise to the level of an indirect expropriation
could nonetheless violate a foreign investor's right to a stable legal
environment." The tribunal found that the government of Turkey
violated the fair and equitable treatment provision of the United
States-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty38 when it denied a
United States corporation developing a power plant a stable and
predictable legal environment by changing relevant regulatory
standards affecting the project.39 The same conduct, however, did
(follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case No.).
33 See id. T1178-80.

34 Id. 200.
35 Id. 133.
36 PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award
(Jan. 17, 2007) http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases"
hyperlink; then follow "Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search"
hyperlink and enter Case No.).
37 See id. TT 250-56.
38 Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Turk., Dec. 3, 1985, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 99-19 (1990).
39 See PSEG
250-56. The tribunal suggested that the vague nature of the
standard for fair and equitable treatment enables it to be used as a basis for finding
liability when no violation of other standards of protection (such as the prohibition on
uncompensated expropriation) can be found. See id 1 238-39:
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not rise to the level necessary to support a finding of indirect
expropriation. 40 The tribunal suggested that the standard for a
breach of fair and equitable treatment is easier for an investor to
satisfy than the standard for indirect expropriation with regard to
both the degree of adverse effect and the specificity of the relevant
economic interests. 4 1 An investor is required only to show that
"legitimate expectation(s)" were "affected," rather than the "strong
interference" with "clearly defined . .. rights" required to find
expropriation. 42
indirect

The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired prominence in
investment arbitration as a consequence of the fact that other standards
traditionally provided by international law might not in the circumstances of
each case be entirely appropriate. This is particularly the case when the facts of
the dispute do not clearly support the claim for direct expropriation, but when
there are notwithstanding events that need to be assessed under a different
standard to provide redress in the event that the rights of the investor have been
breached.
Because the role of fair and equitable treatment changes from case to case, it is
sometimes not as precise as would be desirable. Yet, it clearly does allow for
justice to be done in the absence of the more traditional breaches of
international law standards. This role has resulted in the concept of fair and
equitable treatment acquiring a standing on its own, separate and distinct from
that of other standards, albeit many times closely related to them, and thus
ensuring that the protection granted to the investment is fully safeguarded.
Id.
See id. %f272-80.
See id.1279.
42 See PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5,
Award, 1 279 (Jan. 17, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow
"Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced
Search" hyperlink and enter Case No.); see also id. 1 245 (stating that "the role of fair
and equitable treatment in this case does not bring the standard near to expropriation or
other forms of taking"). Other tribunals have similarly found that government measures
that did not have sufficiently adverse effects on an investment to constitute acts of
indirect expropriation nonetheless violated the investors' right to a stable and predictable
legal environment. See, e.g., Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of
Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, TT 80-92 (July 1, 2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 54
(2007) (denying Occidental's claim that Ecuador had indirectly expropriated its right to a
refund of value added taxes that Occidental had paid on purchases it made related to its
oil production contract with a state-owned oil company); id. $T 180-92 (holding that
Ecuador's change in policy regarding Value-Added Tax violated Occidental's rights to a
stable and predictable legal environment); see also CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, TT 252-64 (May 12, 2005),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
40
41
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This broad-if vaguely defined-right to compensation for
regulatory measures that infringe on an investor's expectations
concerning the value or profitability of an investment has emerged
as arguably the most powerful right conferred on investors under
HAs. As discussed below, however, this right, which is frequently
characterized as the relevant standard under customary
international law, is not rooted in state practice and is significantly
more expansive than comparable doctrines under the domestic
laws of most nations.
III.

State Practice and International Regulatory
Takings Doctrine

A. The Practiceof States RegardingRegulatory
Expropriation
In order to constitute CIL, the purported international law
prohibition on uncompensated regulatory takings would need to be
rooted in the general and consistent practice of states. It is fairly
clear, however, that it is not the general and consistent practice of
states to compensate investors when government measures
adversely affect the value of their property or frustrate their
In fact, there is not any
investment-backed expectations.4 3
"general and consistent practice" on this issue. The lead author of
a comparative study of regulatory takings doctrine in thirteen
countries noted the following:
[T]here is no universally consensual approach, nor even a

No.) (rejecting the claim that Argentina had indirectly expropriated the claimant's
investment in a gas transmission company by modifying the legal framework governing
the assessment of tariffs); id. TT 266-84 (finding that the same actions by Argentina
constituted a breach of the claimant's right to a stable legal framework); Azurix Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, $$ 306-22 (July 14, 2006),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet (follow "Cases" hyperlink; then follow
"Search Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Advanced Search" hyperlink and enter Case
No.) (rejecting the claim that an Argentine province's actions with regard to a water
services company owned by a U.S. corporation-including restricting rates that could be
charged for the services-constituted an expropriation under the terms of the 1991
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment between
Argentina and the United States); id. % 358-378 (finding that the same conduct violated
the investor's right to fair and equitable treatment).
43 See Alterman, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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dominant approach. Different countries at different times have
adopted varying approaches to dealing with the property-values
dilemmas. The diversity is great: No two countries have the
same law on regulatory takings-not even countries with
ostensibly similar legal and administrative traditions. The
differences among the countries are significant and often
unpredictable on the basis of other attributes known about these
countries.44
Moreover, to the extent that there is a "majority rule"
concerning a right to compensation for government measures that
have significant adverse effects on the value of investments, it is
that such measures are not compensable.45 A.J. Van der Walt, in
his groundbreaking treatise on constitutional property clauses,
concluded that "the distinction between police-power regulation of
the use of property and eminent-domain expropriation of property
is fundamental to all property clauses, because only the latter is
compensated as a rule. Normally, there will be no provision for
compensation for deprivations or losses caused by police-power
regulation of property."4 6
Although CIL is formed by the "general" practice of states,
there is no specific quantitative threshold of nations that must
adhere to a practice in order for it to become CIL.4 7 Instead, the
practice must be shared by a sufficiently representative number of
states, particularly those that have a specific interest in the subject
matter of the purported rule-i.e., "specially affected States." 48
Conversely, rejection of a practice by specially affected States can
prevent the formation of a rule of CIL.49 Accordingly, in
determining the content of CIL with regard to the treatment of

44

Id

45 A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE

15-17 (1999).
Id. at 17. F.A. Mann reached a similar conclusion over 50 years ago. See Mann,
supra note 10, at 583 n.53 (1960) ("The distinction between regulation and taking is both
fundamental and universal.").
47 See ILA Report, supra note 10, at 25 (stating that no "precise number or
percentage of States is required" to demonstrate general practice).

ANALYSIS
46

48 Id. at 26.

49 See id. (noting that "if important actors do not accept the practice, it cannot
mature into a rule of general customary law").
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foreign investment, it is appropriate to focus on the practices of the
major capital importing and exporting countries, which
presumably constitute the relevant "specially affected States."
With regard to developing countries, the approaches of two
leading recipients of foreign direct investments (hereinafter
"FDI")-India and China-are illustrative. China has recently
enacted constitutional reforms and a property rights law that
require compensation for government acquisitions of private
property but that do not address "regulatory" takings.o India's
Constitution provides even less protection against expropriations,
requiring only that deprivations of property rights-including
regulatory deprivations-be legally authorized.'
Although the rejection of regulatory takings doctrine has been
most prevalent among developing countries,52 even the domestic
practice of the major capital exporting states (which are also
50 See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-Lin Chen, Bargainingfor Compensation in
the Shadow of Regulatory Giving: The Case ofStock Trading Rights Reform in China,
20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 298, 323 (2006) ("[T]he latest amended Constitution expressly
states that the government can acquire the citizen's private property if required by public
interest and with compensation.
This provision only expressly provides for
compensation under actual property acquisition or requisition. Currently, there is
certainly no equivalent Chinese doctrine of regulatory takings."); Li Ping, The Impact of
Regulatory Takings by the Chinese State on Rural Land Tenure and Property Rights,
LANDESA AND RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE, at 9 (Rights and Resources Initiative,

2007), http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_322.pdf
("Currently,
China does not have a regulatory takings law. As a result, the government is not
required to pay compensation . .. for its regulatory actions that benefit the public as a
whole."); see also Gebhard M. Rehm & Hinrich Julius, The New Chinese Property
Rights Law: An Evaluation From a ContinentalPerspective,22 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 177,
222 (2009) (discussing expropriation provisions of China's 2007 property rights law and
concluding that it "does not strengthen the rights of the owner as against the previous
legal position").
51 See VAN DER WALT, supra note 45, at 215-16. The Indian Parliament repeatedly

amended the property clauses of the 1950 Constitution in response to judicial decisions
interpreting the clauses to limit the government's authority to pursue social and
economic reforms. See id at 192-202. Eventually, Parliament repealed the property
clauses and replaced them with a provision stating merely that "no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law." See id at 203.
52 See Wang & Chen, supra note 50, at 332 ("[M]any ... countries, particularly
developing countries, have yet to extend private property rights protection to regulatory
takings."); see also Alterman, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that in most non-democratic
countries without developed economies "planning laws often are irrelevant (because of
corruption or widespread noncompliance), and regulatory takings law is either dormant
(no claims filed) or nonexistent").
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among the leading recipients of FDI) does not support the
existence of a CIL prohibition on uncompensated regulatory
takings. As demonstrated by the discussion below of the approach
to regulatory expropriation doctrine in several leading exporters of
FDI, the most that can be said regarding state practice in this area
is that some states provide compensation under certain
circumstances for regulatory measures. Moreover, the states that
recognize regulatory expropriations almost always limit the right
to compensation to land use regulations" and usually require that
the measure have a dramatically adverse impact on property rights,
such as eliminating a development right that had already vested or
rendering real property essentially valueless.54
1. The United States
United States jurisprudence under the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment has been the most influential source of state
practice in the development of international regulatory
expropriation doctrine." Nonetheless, U.S. regulatory takings
doctrine does not provide as broad a right to compensation as the
purported international standard-particularly with regard to the
scope of economic interests that are covered and the degree of
adverse economic impact that is required to find a regulatory
expropriation.5 6
United States jurisprudence does not support the purported
international standard for regulatory takings on the significant
issue of the scope of economic interests to which the right of

53 See Rachel Alterman, Comparative Analysis: A Platform for Cross-National
Learning, in TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAND USE

REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 78.

[I]n most countries (with few exceptions), regulatory takings-especially partial
takings-are not an open-ended concept; a statute usually defines a limited set of
government decisions that may entail compensation. The historic as well as the
current core of compensable decisions in most countries revolves around classic
land use planning and zoning (not even all types of potential[ly] injurious
decisions are necessarily included).
Id.
54 See id.

55 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 31, 353-55 (discussing the influence ofU.S. law on
the development of international takings doctrine).
56 See id. at 355-56.
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compensation applies. Unlike the broad approach to defining
covered "investment" under HAs," the takings clause of the U.S.
Constitution applies only to property rights, which the U.S.
Supreme Court has indicated must be "created and their
dimensions ... defined" by an independent source (typically state
law). 59 As Justice Antonin Scalia has noted, "business in the sense
of the activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit
is not property" and therefore is not entitled to the same
constitutional protection. 60
Accordingly, in order to assert a takings claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the economic interest that she claims has been
taken constitutes "property" as defined by some relevant source of
law. 6 1 Moreover, regulatory takings claims-as opposed to claims
based on the actual appropriation of an asset-generally must be
based on an interest in real property. 62 The Court has indicated

57 See id. at 356-58.
58 See id. at 353-55.
59 Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
60 Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999).
61 See generally Matthew C. Porterfield, InternationalExpropriation Rules and
Federalism, 23 STANFORD ENVT'L L.J. 3, 4-5 (2004) (describing takings in the context of
the North American Free Trade Agreement).
62 For discussion of the role of real property, see id. at 11-16 (describing the role
of real property in U.S. Supreme Court cases for regulatory takings). See also Eduardo
Mois~s Pefialver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in
Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 231 (2004) ("[I]t is almost beyond
dispute that ... the Court has focused overwhelmingly on regulations affecting land and
that landowners bringing regulatory takings claims stand a greater chance of prevailing
in the Supreme Court than the owners of other sorts of property."); Molly S. McUsic,
The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic
Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605, 655 (1996) ("Economic interests, such as personal
property, trade secrets, copyright, and money, are all recognized by the Court as
'property' under the Fifth Amendment, but receive little protection against government
regulation."); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 127 (1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court has shown absolutely
no interest in applying the regulatory takings doctrine to assets other than land."). See
Michael A. Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils of (Mis)reasoning
by Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1355 (2000) for a discussion of the Supreme Court's rare
attempts to apply the regulatory takings analysis outside the context of real property. A
four justice plurality (Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by William Rehnquist, Antonin
Scalia and ClarenceThomas) did apply the regulatory takings analysis to broad economic
interests in Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), finding that the retroactive
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that other forms of property-such as personal property or
contract rights-typically may not be the basis of a successful
regulatory takings claim.63 Investment tribunals, in contrast, have
found regulatory expropriations in forms of investment that would
not even qualify as property under U.S. law. 64 The relationship of
expropriation claims to specific property rights as defined by
domestic law is even more attenuated under the fair and equitable
treatment version of regulatory takings doctrine, which focuses on
the effects of the government measures on the investor's
"legitimate expectations" rather than on clearly defined rights. 6 5
United States takings jurisprudence also differes from the
purported international standard in its approach to the degree of
adverse effect that government measure must have on the relevant
property in order to require compensation. Under the rule first
announced by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,66 regulatory measures that destroy all economic value of a
property are generally considered to constitute per se takings.6 7
imposition of liability on a former coal mine operator for the health benefits of retired
miners constituted a regulatory taking. Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred with the
judgment on due process grounds, but rejected the plurality's application of regulatory
takings doctrine:
Until today . . . one constant limitation has been that in all of the cases where
the regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or
interest has been at stake. . . . [T]he plurality's opinion disregards this
requirement and, by removing this constant characteristic from takings analysis,
would expand an already difficult and uncertain rule to a vast category of cases
not deemed, in our law, to implicate the Takings Clause.
Id. at 541-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
63 See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) ("[I]n the
case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control
over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new
regulation might even render his property economically worthless . . . ."); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1986) ("Contracts may create rights
of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control
of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions
from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.").
64 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 31, at 355-56.

65 See Newcombe, supra note 20, at 292-93.
66 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Even a regulatory measure that completely
destroys the value of a property, however, does not constitute a taking if it merely
enforces some pre-existing limitation on the permissible uses of the land. See id. at
1029-30.
67 See id. at 1029-30.
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Measures that do not completely eliminate the value of property
may also constitute regulatory takings under the "ad hoc balancing
test" of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
Although the Penn Central analysis does not amount to a "set
formula,"6 9 the Court has noted that-like the Lucas test-it "aims
to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private
property or ousts the owner from his domain." 70
In contrast, international investment tribunals, although by no
means consistent on this point, have indicated that regulatory
measures may constitute acts of expropriation even if they only
have a "substantial" or "significant" adverse impact on the value
of an investment.7 ' Moreover, there appears to be an even lower
threshold of adverse economic impact required to support a claim
68 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn
Central test focuses on three factors: "[1] The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; . . . [2] the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations; . . . [and 3] the character of the governmental action."
Id. at 124.
69 Id.

70 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
71 See Porterfield,supra note 61, at 7. This is another issue that recent U.S. HAs
have addressed by including language that attempts to harmonize the international
standard with United States regulatory takings law in response to Congress's "no greater
rights" mandate. Id. Recent U.S. agreements reflect the high threshold for establishing
regulatory takings, stating that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriations." See U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 24, Annex 10-B,
3(b).
Although the references to "rare circumstances" is presumably taken from Justice
Scalia's observation in Lucas that the per se rule takings would only apply in "the
relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all
economically beneficial uses," it also accurately describes the extremely high threshold
for regulatory takings under the Penn Central standard. Id. at 505 U.S. at 1018. See
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 and accompanying text; see also Mark W. Cordes, Takings
Jurisprudenceas Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 38 (2005-

2006) ("[T]akings under Penn Central are to be relatively rare exceptions based on
compelling facts."). Supporters of broad international standards of protection, however,
have objected that the reference to "rare circumstances" results in a standard for indirect
expropriation that is more narrow that the international standard. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model BilateralInvestment Treaty: An Exercise in the
Regressive Development of InternationalLaw, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT,

at 1, 6 (April 2006) ("Can it plausibly be maintained that the exception only for 'rare
circumstances' is found in customary international law?").
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under the "stable regulatory environment" interpretation of fair
and equitable treatment. 2 Accordingly, even the jurisprudence of
the United States does not provide evidence of state practice
supporting the purported customary international standard for
regulatory expropriation.
2. Canada

Canada provides an example of a major capital-exporting
nation that has rejected regulatory takings doctrine in its domestic
jurisprudence. Canadian constitutional law does not require
compensation for actual expropriations of property, let alone
"regulatory" expropriations.73 Section Seven of the "Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" of Canada's 1982 Constitution contains
some language similar to the due process clauses of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, 4 but
conspicuously does not refer to property rights or a right to
compensation for takings. The drafters of the Charter intentionally
omitted references to property rights in order to avoid language
that could be used by the Canadian courts to invalidate economic
regulations in a manner similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court
during the Lochner era." The Canadian courts have accordingly
rejected attempts to construe Section Seven broadly to apply to

72 See supra Part II.B.
73 See Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Canada, in TAKINGS
INTERNATIONAL:

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND

COMPENSATION RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 93 ("Canada's constitutional framework lacks

safeguards to protect property owners from governments that unjustifiably expropriate
private property."); L. Kinvin Wroth, Lingle and Kelo: The Accidental Tourist in
Canadaand NAFTA-Land, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 62, 77 (2005-2006) ("In Canada . .. the

law of expropriation lack[s] a constitutional basis").
74 Cr. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, Part I of the Constitution
Act of 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, cl. 11, § 7 ("Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."), with U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law"), and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
75 See Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2
INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 16-27 (2004). The drafters of the Charter also used the term
"principles of fundamental justice" rather than "due process" in section 7 in order to
avoid Lochner-like judicial review of economic regulation. See id at 21-24.
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economic rights.76
Property rights do receive some limited protection under the
1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, which is a statutory rather than
constitutional provision.n Section One of the Bill of Rights states
that individuals enjoy "the right . . . to life, liberty, security of the

person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived
thereof except by due process of law."7 8 Section One, however,
has been interpreted to require only procedural fairness and,
consequently, does not provide a right to compensation for
expropriation.7 9
Instead, expropriation is addressed by statutory provisions at
both the provincial and federal levels.o These statutes operate in
the context of a common law presumption that compensation is
required for actual expropriations of property, absent a clear
expression to the contrary in the relevant legislation."
The
statutory expropriation provisions, however, have been interpreted
to require compensation for regulatory measures only when the
government has both eliminated essentially all rights associated
with the ownership of property and appropriated a property
interest for itself.8 2 The requirement that the government acquires
76 See Att'y Gen. of Quebec v. Irwin Toy Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 1003 (Can.)
("The intentional exclusion of property from s. 7 . . . leads to a general inference that
economic rights as generally encompassed by the term 'property' are not within the
perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee.").
77 See VAN DER WALT, supra note 45, at 86.
78 The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, § 1(a).
79 See Authorson v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, 1 51 (Can.) ("The
Bill of Rights does not protect against the expropriation of property by the passage of
unambiguous legislation."); see also Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert,
Regulatory Takings in Canada, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 477, 479 (2006)
("[U]nder the Canadian Bill of Rights, measures infringing on property owners' right to
the enjoyment of property need only satisfy procedural fairness; no case holds that 'due
process of law' also requires substantive fairness, such as just compensation."). Even the
limited procedural protections of the Bill of Rights apply only to federal law. See
Schwartz & Bueckert, supra,at 479; VAN DER WALT, supra note 45, at 87.
80 See Schwartz & Bueckert, supra note 73, at 478.
81 See Daniel H. Cole, PoliticalInstitutions,JudicialReview, and Private Property:
A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 160 (2007)
(discussing the presumption in favor of compensation for actual expropriations under the
common law of the United Kingdom).
82 See Schwartz & Bueckert, supra note 73, at 487-88; see also Att'y Gen. of Nova
Scotia v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., (1999), 177 D.L.R. 4th 696, 718 (Can.).
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some property interest in order for a compensable taking to
occur-regardless of what loss the property owner has suffereddistinguishes Canadian takings doctrine from both U.S. law and
the purported CIL standard.
The Supreme Court of Canada applied the common law
presumption in favor of compensation for expropriations in
ManitobaFisheries v. Canada." The court in Manitoba Fisheries
held that the Freshwater Fish Marketing Act's award of an
exclusive right to market freshwater fish to a Crown corporation
constituted a compensable taking of the goodwill of a company
whose fish-selling business was consequently destroyed.84
Although the Act did not provide for compensation, the court
awarded compensation based on the "recognized rule . . . that,

unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not
to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject
without compensation.""
In British Columbia v. Tener,86 the Supreme Court of Canada
similarly noted the "long standing presumption of a right to
compensation"" in holding that British Columbia had expropriated
the property of the holders of mineral rights in a provincial park by
denying them access to the park to extract the minerals." The
court concluded that "[t]he denial of access to these lands ...
amounts to a recovery by the Crown of a part of the right
[previously] granted to the respondents .... This acquisition by
the Crown constitutes a taking from which compensation must
flow."8 9
Although Manitoba Fisheries and Tener have been cited as
evidence that Canadian law provides property owners with a right
to compensation for regulatory expropriations,90 in both cases the
83 [1979] 1 SYC.R. 101 (Can.).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 109 (quoting Att'y Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508
at 542 (H.L.)).
86 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.).
87 Id. at 559.

88 See id. at 533.
89 Id. at 563.

90 See Att'y Gen. of Nova Scotia v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd., (1999), 177 D.L.R.
4th 696, 723 (Can.) ("Some cases have interpreted Tener and/or Manitoba Fisheries as
standing for the proposition that the loss of virtually all economic value of land is the
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court characterized the governmental action as involving an actual
seizure of an asset. In Tener, the court noted that the denial of
access to the park to exercise the mineral rights effectively
constituted a reacquisition of those rights by the province."
Similarly, in Manitoba Fisheries, the court concluded that the
granting of the exclusive marketing rights to the government
corporation effectively resulted in the compulsory transfer of the
goodwill of the private company to that corporation.92
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeals stressed this aspect of
Canadian takings doctrine in MarinerReal Estate v. Nova Scotia,93
which involved facts strikingly similar to those considered by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas94 -i.e., a claim that the province's
refusal to permit construction of houses on several waterfront lots
constituted a compensable regulatory taking under the Nova Scotia
Expropriation Act." The court indicated that in order to constitute
a compensable act of expropriation, a government measure must
not only result in "the extinguishment of virtually all incidents of
ownership" of the affected property, but must also involve "an
acquisition of land by the expropriating authority.""
Addressing the first criterion, the court noted that (as in Lucas)
the trial court had concluded that the construction ban had
deprived the plaintiffs of "virtually all economic value of their
lands." 97 The court indicated, however, that under Canadian law, a
measure must not only eliminate all economic value, it must
loss of an interest in land within the meaning of expropriation legislation."). See also
Donna R. Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Taking Analysis in Land Use Regulation in
the United States, Australia and Canada,32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 343, 396 (2007) ("Tener
is sometimes characterized as standing for the proposition that a taking occurs when the
regulation leaves the land with virtually no economic value.").
91 See British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533, 599 (Can.).
92 See Manitoba Fisheries v. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, Ill (Can.) ("Once it is
accepted that the loss of the goodwill of the appellant's business which was brought
about by the Act and by the setting up of the Corporation was a loss of property and that
the same goodwill was by statutory compulsion acquired by the federal authority, it
seems . . . to follow that the appellant was deprived of property which was acquired by
the Crown.").
93 See Mariner Real Estate Ltd, 177 D.L.R. 4th 696.
94 See discussion of Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
95 See Mariner Real Estate, 177 D.L.R. 4th 696.
96 Id. at 718.
97 Id. at 719.
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destroy "virtually all rights associated with ownership." 8 The
court concluded that this standard had not been met because the
property could still be used for various purposes, including
camping and other recreational uses.99
Moreover, the court noted, to constitute a compensable
expropriation there must not only be denial of any uses of the
property, but there must also be an acquisition of the property
interest by the government.'o Accordingly, the court rejected as
inapplicable the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Lucas, noting
that
U.S. constitutional law has, on this issue, taken a fundamentally
different path than . has Canadian law concerning the
interpretation of expropriation legislation. In U.S. constitutional
law, regulation which has the effect of denying the owner all
economically beneficial or productive use of land constitutes a
taking of property for which compensation must be paid. Under
Canadian expropriation law, deprivation of economic value is
not a taking of land . . .. It follows that U.S. constitutional law

cases cannot be relied on as accurately stating Canadian law on
this point. Moreover, in U.S. constitutional law ... deprivation
of property through regulation for public purposes is sufficient
to bring a case within the constitutional protection against taking
for "public use", unlike the situation under the Expropriation
Act which requires the taking of land. It is not ... necessary in
U.S. constitutional law to show that the state acquires any title
or interest in the land regulated. For these reasons . . . the U.S.

takings clause cases are not of assistance in determining whether
there has been an acquisition of land within the meaning of the
Nova Scotia ExpropriationAct.''
The requirement that the government acquire an interest in
property in order for there to be a compensable taking not only
distinguishes Canadian expropriation doctrine from U.S. law, it
also precludes Canadian law as a source of state practice that

Id. at 728.
99 Id. at 728-29.
100 See Mariner Real Estate, 177 D.L.R. 4th at 732.
101 Id.
98
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supports the purported customary international law standard for

regulatory takings based solely on the adverse impact of the
government measures on the investment.
3. Western Europe
The nations of Western Europe-which collectively constitute
the leading source of FDIl 0 2 -do not share a consistent doctrine on
regulatory expropriation.1o
In general, however, the leading
European exporters of FDI provide only narrow compensation
rights targeted at specific types of land use regulations.104
In the United Kingdom, for example, Parliament may actually
seize property without compensation, although there is a
"convention" under the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution
of providing compensation for such seizures, which has resulted in
102 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2007, at
70, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2007, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007).
103 See Alterman, supra note 53, at 77 ("[T]here is no European approach to
regulatory takings. The nine European countries [examined] exhibit the full scale of
legal (and public policy) approaches to regulatory takings, almost to the very
extremes."). Some harmonization of the practice of European states concerning
regulatory expropriation could conceivably be achieved through the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights interpreting the property rights provisions of Article I
of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Thus far, however, there is little evidence of such
harmonization:
After decades of ECHR jurisprudence, the differences in approaches to
regulatory takings among the European countries have remained almost as great
as they were in the past . . . [although] ECHR decisions increasingly do place
some limits on the more extreme expressions of the no-compensation side of the
scale.
Id. at 27. The ECHR itself, as a treaty, does not constitute "state practice" for the
purposes of determining CIL. See infra Part IV.B.
104 See e.g., Harvey M. Jacobs, The Future of the Regulatory Takings Issue in the
United States and Europe: Divergence or Convergence?, 40 URB. LAw. 51, 59-60
(2008). As one commentator has noted,
[In much of Europe, government has and continues to have the right to regulate
property, often onerously from a United States perspective, under its presumed
right of imperium. And some European constitutions further reinforce this
tension by expressly noting the social obligations or social rights inherent in
property (and thus the need for individual to curb their individualistic
expectations). What has not happened in Europe is something parallel to the
1922 Pennsylvania Coal decision.
Id. (emphasis added).
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a common law presumption in favor of compensation."o
Accordingly, the United Kingdom has not recognized any general
right to compensation for mere "regulatory" takings.'o Instead,
"rights to compensation in the U.K. are very limited and are
largely related to the revocation or modification of a valid [land
use] planning permission."'o7 Landowners may also seek inverse
condemnation of their property in certain narrow circumstances, 0 o
however, "[t]he overriding principle ... is that where the
development of land is restricted in the name of the public interest,
landowners do not have the right to compensation."' 09
France takes a similar approach and does not provide
landowners with a broad right to compensation for regulatory
measures that adversely affect the value of their property."o
105 Cole, supra note 81, at 154-60.

106 Philip A. Joseph, The Environment, Property Rights, and Public Choice Theory,
20 N.Z. UNIv. L. R. 408, 425 (2003) ("The common law has systematically avoided the
concept of a regulatory taking. [For English courts,] a mere negative prohibition, though
it involves interference with an owner's enjoyment of property, does not . . . carry with it
at common law any right to compensation.").
107 Michael Purdue, United Kingdom, in TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS, supra note 13, at

119.
10 Id A landowner may petition the government to purchase his property "where
either (1) the land is zoned for public works that requires the land to be publicly owned,
or (2) a development control decision renders the property incapable of any beneficial
use." Id The latter category-elimination of any beneficial use-is similar to the
categorical taking rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas. See note 66,
supra and accompanying text; see also Cole, supra note 81, at 168 (concluding that the
United States generally provides constitutional prohibition on uncompensated regulatory
takings provides only marginally greater protections than the United Kingdom's
statutory compensation provisions). The United Kingdom's system, however, is
significantly less protective in several respects, including the standard of compensation "existing use value" in the United Kingdom as compared with "fair market value" in the
United States. See id. at 170.
Another interesting point of comparison is the treatment of regulations requiring the
granting of public access to private property. The United States Supreme Court treats
such compelled physical invasions of property as a form of taking requiring
compensation. See Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights:
The Right to Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539, 542 (2006). The British Parliament, in
contrast, has enacted a law requiring private landowners to provide extensive public
access to "open country" without any compensation. See id. at 546.
109 Purdue, supra note 107, at 119.
110 Vincent A. Renard, France, in TAKINGS INTERNATIONAL:

A COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS, supra note 13, at
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Compensation is only available under certain narrow exceptions to
the "non-compensation principle," such as when a building permit
is revoked in a manner that extinguishes vested rights."'
Germany provides more extensive compensation rights for
overly burdensome land use regulations than either the United
Kingdom or France, but the rights are restricted to certain
statutorily defined situations and in some instances are timelimited." 2 Municipality-wide preparatory land use plans ("Fplans") do not give rise to any compensation rights.'" Binding
land use plans ("B-plans") that are prepared based on the
preliminary plans, however, may give rise to compensation
rights." 4 If, for example, private property is designated for a
future public use such as a school, the owner may seek to compel
the government to purchase the property if she can demonstrate
that the property cannot be used in an economically reasonable
manner in the period before the government purchases the
property."' Similarly, German law also requires compensation for
land use plans that impose public easements on private property in
a manner that significantly, burdens the property."'
In addition to situations involving designation of property for
public uses (which involve the eventual transfer of property
interests to the government and are therefore arguably better

139 ("As opposed to the theory and practice of 'takings' developed in the United States,
the land-use system in France is built on the opposite principle: no compensation has to
be paid for the restriction of development rights resulting from urban regulations."); see
also Jacobs, supra note 104, at 68 ("Under French law, public authorities have both a
broad and a strong set of authorities to manage privately owned land. Owners have no
basis to claim a regulatory taking, and the public may preempt proposed private land
sales.").
I See Renard, supra note 110, at 140-41. Renard notes that these "exceptions to
[the non-compensation] principle have proven to be relatively insignificant as interpreted
by the courts." Id. at 141.
112 Gerd Schmidt-Eichstaedt, The Federal Republic of Germany, in TAKINGS
INTERNATIONAL:

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAND USE REGULATIONS AND

COMPENSATION RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 271-72 ("German law clearly sets out several
different planning situations and spells out the specific compensation rights that apply to
each.").
'13 Id at 272-73.
14 Id.at 273.

115Id. at 273-74.
116 Id. at 275.
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viewed as examples of conventional rather than "regulatory"
expropriation), German law also provides for compensation when
property is down-zoned."' Generally, however, landowners must
exercise their development rights within seven years of when the
binding land use plan is adopted or they will lose their right to
compensation for the down-zoning."
Thus, German law on regulatory expropriation, although
relatively robust when compared with other jurisdictions,'' 9 is also
highly specific to certain statutorily designated land use planning
issues. Accordingly, it does not provide evidence of state practice
supporting a broad right to compensation for government
measures that have significant adverse effects on investments.
B. Is Domestic Law RegardingExpropriationRelevant to
Identifying State Practicefor Purposesof Defining CIL?
It could be argued that the domestic practice of states
regarding property rights is irrelevant for purposes of identifying
customary international law, since CIL is defined by reference to
the practice of states "impinging upon their international legal
relations."' 2 0 Domestic law, however, can constitute relevant state
practice when it implicates international relations, 2 ' and domestic
expropriation standards do affect international relations given that
they generally define the level of protection available to both
foreign and domestic property owners.122
Many states-such as those that follow the Calvo doctrineexplicitly define their legal obligations to foreign investors by
reference to the standards of protection for their nationals under
their domestic law,123 demonstrating the requisite opinio juris to
117 See Schmidt-Eichstaedt, supra note 112, at 275.
118 Id. at 275-76. There are some exceptions to the seven-year time limit. For
example, landowners may seek compensation for restrictions on existing, nonconforming uses even after the seven-year period has expired. See id. at 276-78.
119 See Alterman, supra note 13, at 23. Alterman classifies Germany as having
among the highest standards of protection from regulatory takings. Id
120 ILA Report, supra note 10, at 8.
121 Id at 9.

122 See discussion supra note 10.
123 Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
48, 52 (2008) (explaining that under the Calvo doctrine, "aliens [are] entitled only to the
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establish their domestic law as relevant state practice. The United
States, despite its long history as "one of the most vociferous
critics of the Calvo doctrine," 24 has similarly asserted that its
domestic standard of protection for property rights delineates the
limits of the standard applicable to foreign investors under
international law. In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress asserted
"that United States law on the whole provides a high level of
protection for investment, consistent with or greater than the level
required by international law," and indicated that, accordingly, the
investment provisions of U.S. trade agreements should not provide
foreign investors with "greater substantive rights" than those
available to U.S. investors under domestic law.125 Specifically,
with regard to expropriation, Congress directed USTR to "seek[]
to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for
expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and
practice."l12 6 In response to Congress's no greater rights mandate,
USTR now includes language in U.S. IIAs defining the test for
"indirect expropriation" as a case-by-case inquiry 27 involving
criteria similar to those identified by the Supreme Court in the
Penn Central decision. 28 More recently, pursuant to an agreement
same level of treatment that domestic nationals receive under the domestic laws and
legal system").
124 Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in
Denial ofJustice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 891 (2005).
125 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(3), 116 Stat. 933.
126 Id. § 2102(b)(3)(D).
127 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, annex 10-D, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final Texts (follow
"Investment" hyperlink).
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-bycase, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic
value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect
expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
Id.
128 Cr. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 127, with discussion supra note 68.
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between Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives and
the White House in May 2007,129 the United States has included
language in the preamble of trade agreements stating that foreign
investors are not to be accorded greater substantive rights than
provided for under the domestic law of the United States."o Thus
for nations such as the United States that explicitly link their
standard of treatment of foreign investors to their domestic
standards of protection for property rights, it seems reasonable to
conclude that domestic law regarding expropriation constitutes
state practice for the purposes of identifying expropriation
standards under CIL. Even for nations where there is no explicit
linkage between their treatment of foreign and domestic investors,
domestic expropriation standards are presumably at least relevant
to identifying state practice with regard to foreign investors, absent
any evidence that it is the state's practice to provide foreign
investors with a higher standard of protection. Accordingly, the
domestic practice of states regarding regulatory takings indicates
that there is not a general and consistent practice of providing
investors a right to compensation for regulatory expropriations,
and therefore no such right exists under customary international
law.
Proponents of broad standards of protection under IIAs,
however, generally ignore domestic legal practice and instead rely
on other theories in support of the existence of a right under
international law to compensation for regulatory takings."' Some
of these alternative approaches are considered in the following
section.132
129 See Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy: Investment section VI (May 2007),
availableat http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/05_1407.pdf.
130 See, e.g., U.S.- Peru TPA, supra note 24, at Prmbl. ("foreign investors are not
hereby accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than
domestic investors under domestic law where, as in the United States, protections of
investor rights under domestic law equal or exceed those set forth in this Agreement.").
Peru obtained similar language in the Preamble of the Agreement referencing its
Constitution's incorporation of the Calvo doctrine. Id. (noting that "Article 63 of Peru's
Political Constitution provides that 'domestic and foreign investment are subject to the
same conditions').
131 See generallysupra Part III (discussing a lack of foreign domestic compensation
for government takings).
132 The proposition that HAs themselves constitute state practice for the purposes of
defining the CIL of expropriation is discussed and rejected infra Part IV.A.
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IV.

Alternative Arguments for a Right under
International Law to Compensation for Regulatory
Takings
As discussed above, the domestic law of states does not
support the existence of a right under customary international law
to compensation for regulatory measures that adversely affect the
value of an investment."' There are, however, several other
potential arguments for the existence of such a right under
international law that merit brief discussion.
A. IIAs as State Practice?

It could be argued that BITs either codify or even constitute
state practice regarding regulatory expropriation.'
There are,
The
however, significant problems with this argument.
Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International
Law of the International Law Association, in its Statement of
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary

InternationalLaw, rejected both the general theory that there is a
"presumption that a succession of similar treaty provisions gives
rise to a new customary rule with the same content"' 35 and the
application of that theory to IIAs:
Some have argued that provisions of bilateral investment
protection treaties (especially the arrangements about
compensation or damages for expropriation) are declaratory of,
or have come to constitute, customary law. But ... there seems
to be no special reason to assume that this is the case, unless it
133 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
134 This approach has been used to argue, under CIL, for the existence and broad

interpretation of a right under CIL of foreign investors to a "minimum standard of
treatment" by host governments. See Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes of
InterpretationConstitute a PartialAmendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT'L
L. 347, 358 (2006) ("[T]o the extent that treaties codify existing custom, their content
should influence the application of Article 1105 (1) [which describes NAFTA's
minimum standard of treatment] . . . .

Alternatively, the widespread adoption of

multilateral or bilateral treaties may reflect state practice sufficient to influence the
development of custom . . . ."). See generally Porterfield, supra note 29, at 84-87
(discussing attempts to support the establishment of a minimum standard of treatment for
foreign investors under customary international law by citing the widespread use of BITs
as evidence of a desire to be bound by such a standard).
135 ILA Report, supra note 10, at 45.
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can be shown that these provisions demonstrate a widespread
acceptance of the rules set out in these treaties outside the treaty
framework. In short, there is no presumption that a series of
treaties gives rise to a new rule of customary law, though this
does not preclude such a metamorphosis occurring in particular

cases.136
Given that actual state practice "outside the treaty framework"
does not support the existence of a norm requiring compensation
for regulatory takings,'3 7 it is difficult to see how such a standard
could "metamorphose" from IIAs into a rule of CIL without
fundamentally altering the standard for identifying CIL.'3 1
Furthermore, because this new CIL standard based on IIAs could
presumably be enforced only by foreign investors, it would require
acceptance of the position that it is the general and consistent
practice of countries to provide greater substantive rights to
foreign investors. This position has been explicitly rejected, not
only by nations that assert the Calvo doctrine, but also by the

United States.139
Moreover, even if IIAs could be used to establish rules of CIL,
the terms of IIAs do not generally include language that describes
Although IIAs
the traditional regulatory takings standard.
typically refer to "indirect expropriation" or "measures tantamount
to expropriation," they generally do not indicate that these terms
refer to situations in which regulatory measures cause some level
of adverse economic effect on investments rather than where there
has been some actual appropriation of an asset by the
government.'4 0 Thus, even if IIAs were accepted as state practice,
Id at 48.
137 See supra Part III.A.
138 Some commentators have in fact suggested that the definition of CIL needs to be
altered so as to encompass obligations widely included in BITs. Andreas Lowenfeld, for
example, argues that BITs create "something like customary law." Andreas Lowenfeld,
136

Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 130

(2003). If BITs fail to satisfy the requirement that state practice be undertaken out of a
sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) in order to give rise to CIL, Lowenfeld suggests,
"perhaps the traditional definition of customary law is wrong, or at least ... incomplete."
Id.
139 See supra Part III.B.
140 See Newcombe, supra note 20, at 18-20 (arguing that treaty language referring to
measures "equivalent" or "tantamount" to expropriation should not be read to broaden
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proponents of this approach would need to rely on the decisions of
tribunals to identify the content of this state practice.
Of course, if the reference to "indirect" expropriation in
investment agreements does not refer to regulatory measures that
adversely affect the value of investments without actually
transferring their ownership or control, the term presumably must
The most obvious alternative
have some other meaning.14'
interpretation would be that an indirect expropriation involves the
actual appropriation of an investment by the government that is
achieved through indirect means, rather than through a direct
confiscation of the asset. Andrew Newcombe has argued that this
approach is consistent with most arbitral decisions awarding
compensation for indirect expropriation.'4 2 An interpretation of
indirect expropriation that required acquisition of the investment
(albeit through indirect means) may also be consistent with state
practice given the evidence of widespread support in the domestic
law of states for a right to compensation for actual appropriations
of property.'43 Under this approach, an appropriation would be
the concept of expropriation to cover measures that merely adversely affect the value of
investments). The language that has been included in U.S. 11As in response to
Congress's "no greater rights" mandate includes (like the Penn Centraldecision that it is
based on) reference to the economic impact of the government action as relevant to the
determination of whether there has been an indirect expropriation. See, e.g., Free Trade
Agreement, U.S-Chile, annex 10-D, I 4(a)(i), June 6, 2003, 42 1.L.M. 1026. Even U.S.
HAs, however, note that "the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish
that an indirect expropriation has occurred." Id
141 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 1 1, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.").
142 Newcombe, supra note 20, at 6 ("[A]lmost all international expropriation cases
can be viewed as cases of direct or indirect state appropriation.").
143 See supra Part III. For an early attempt to link a right to compensation under
international law to the domestic standards of protection, see Chandler P. Anderson,
Basis of the Law Against Confiscating Foreign-OwnedProperty, 21 AM J. INT'L L. 525
(July 1927). Anderson surveys the laws of the "elder members of the family of nations,"
and finds that "in every instance the taking of private property in time of peace is
prohibited unless for public uses and except upon the payment of adequate
compensation." Id. at 525. This principle, Anderson asserts, has become part of the "law
of nations." Id at 526. Significantly, however, Anderson distinguishes the right to
compensation for expropriation of property from situations involving the exercise of
regulatory authority. Id. at 525.
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considered "indirect" if the government acquired effective control
and benefit of the foreign investment without actually seizing title.
This was the case, for example, in the disputes addressed by the
Iran-U.S. Claims tribunal in which the Iranian government
appointed its own directors and executives to gain control of
foreign owned companies. 144
B. TribunalDecisions as IndependentSources of a
Prohibitionon UncompensatedRegulatory
Expropriation?
It could also be argued that tribunal decisions-identified as a
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law" under
Article Thirty-Eight of the Statute of the International Court of
a right to compensation for regulatory
Justice145-support
146
Under this approach, foreign investors enjoy a right to
takings.
The right of a state to take or destroy private property under the so-called police
powers of the state, in the regulation of the morals, health and safety of the
community, presents a fundamentally different question from the confiscation
of private property as a national policy, whether communistic, or anti-foreign,
or merely for mercenary purposes, which is the only aspect of the question now
under consideration.
Id. at 525.
144 See ITT Industries v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 348, 352 (1983) (stating
that the Iranian government effectively expropriated the investment of a U.S. corporation
within company by replacing members of board of directors); Tippetts v. Iran, 6 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225-226 (1984) (finding that the Iranian government had
indirectly expropriated the property of a U.S. company by appointing a new manager of
its partnership with an Iranian firm).
145 Article 38(1) states that the ICJ shall decide disputes in accordance with
international conventions (treaties), customary law, general principles of law, and
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 38 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.
993. The decisions of investment tribunals presumably fall within the scope of the
"judicial decisions" referred to in Article 38. See id. Although the "teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists" are accorded similar status as "subsidiary means" of
determining international law and play a prominent role in arbitral jurisprudence, there
appears to be less support for explicitly elevating them from "subsidiary means" for
determining rules of law than there is for a similar promotion for arbitral awards. See
Alvarez, supra note 10, at 45-46 ("In today's world, states-and not merely fellow
investor-state arbitrators-accord considerable more deference to the relevant decisions
of supra-national dispute settlement bodies than they do to a law review article.").
'146 See Alvarez, supra note 10, at 45 (arguing that "publicly available arbitral
decisions, including those by investor-state arbitrators, are more than just 'subsidiary
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compensation for acts of regulatory expropriation largely because
strong support for such a right can be found in the awards of
investment tribunals.14 7 From a legal realist perspective, this
position is hard to dispute. Tribunals are vested with significant
power to state what the relevant law is in investor-state disputes,
including by articulating broad regulatory expropriation doctrines
without regard to actual state practice (frequently citing only other
tribunal awards and the writings of sympathetic commentators).' 4 8
Tribunal awards, however, are generally viewed as only
constituting evidence of international law, not as independent
sources.149 And to the extent that the decisions of tribunals assert
that CIL contains rights that are not supported by state practice,
Tribunals may enjoy the
they are of little evidentiary value.'
effective judicial power to "say what the [customary international]

means for the determination of rules of law"'); Hirsch, supra note 10, at 27 ("An
examination of decisions rendered by investment tribunals indicates that investment
tribunals that pronounce various customary rules are inclined not to discuss the existence
(or lack of) of the separate components of 'practice' and 'opinion juris', and that they
frequently rely on decisions of international courts and tribunals.
147 See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 18.
148 Id. at 11-12.
149 See ILA Report, supra note 10, part I § 2(viii) cmt.
[I]t is important . . . to distinguish between "formal" sources [of international
law], which are those processes which, if they are observed, create rules of law
(such as treaties and custom), and what Schwarzenberger called "lawdetermining agencies" (or, one might say more simply but more crudely,
"evidential sources"). The latter are identified in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice as "judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law."
Id. See also id. Part II(B) § 10 ("Although international courts and tribunals ultimately
derive their authority from States, it is not appropriate to regard their decisions as a form
of State practice."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 rep. note 1 (1987) ("[T]he 'judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,' mentioned in Article 38(1)
(d) of the Statute of the Court... are not sources in the same sense because they are not
ways in which law is made or accepted, but opinion-evidence as to whether some rule
has in fact become or been accepted as international law.").
150 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103, cmt. a (1987) ([J]udicial and arbitral decisions and the writings of
scholars constitute "secondary evidence. . . . [which] may be negated by primary
evidence, for example, as to customary law, by proof as to what state practice is in
fact.").
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law is"'"' without regard to actual state practice, but this power,
lacking any coherent and widely accepted theoretical basis, is not
the same as the legitimate authority to do so.
C. Compensationfor Regulatory Expropriationas a Treaty
Obligation?
It could also be argued that even if HAs cannot be used to
demonstrate the existence of a CIL prohibition on uncompensated
regulatory takings, they do establish such a right as a treaty
obligation.' 52 Yet, as already noted, because IIAs typically do not
explicitly state that regulatory measures adversely affecting the
value of an investment constitute forms of indirect expropriation,
proponents of this interpretation would need to rely on the
decisions of tribunals to define the vague terms "indirect
expropriation" and "fair and equitable treatment" in this manner.
Moreover, there is no indication that IIAs are intended to
establish a treaty standard for indirect expropriation that confers
greater rights on foreign investors than the standard under CIL.1'
To the contrary, some IIAs explicitly link the standard for
expropriation to the CIL standard.'54
It is less clear whether the "fair and equitable treatment"
component of the minimum standard of treatment-and
specifically its interpretation to include a right to a "stable
regulatory environment" that functions like a broad version of
regulatory takings doctrine'-is intended to expand upon
customary international law. Some tribunals and commentators
151 Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("[I]t is emphatically the duty
of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.").
152 See Newcombe, supra note 20, at 10-11 (citing W. M. Reisman and R.D. Sloane,
IndirectExpropriationand Its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
115 [2003]).
153 See id. at 19.

154 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., annex B, 1 1, Nov. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/bit/asset upload file748 900
5.pdf (The treaty's expropriation article "is intended to reflect customary international
law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation."); Free Trade
available at
10-D,
June
6,
2003,
Agreement,
U.S.-Chile,
annex
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final Texts/ (follow
"Investments" hyperlink).
155 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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have taken the position that "fair and equitable treatment" is
intended to provide more expansive (or "additive") protection
beyond that which is provided for under CIL.156 It does not
appear, however, that any state has supported this approach.15 1
Several countries, in fact, have explicitly rejected this view in
their recent treaty practice, linking the minimum standard of
treatment to the standard of protection under customary
international law.'"' For example, the minimum standard of
treatment article of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement indicates that it refers to the "customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens," and further notes
that "[t]he concept of 'fair and equitable treatment' . . . do[es] not

require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by that standard, and do[es] not create additional substantive
156 See generally Porterfield,supra note 29, at 89-90.
157 See Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 1 7, Separate
Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken on the Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGSeparateOpinion.pdf ("[N]o . . . State
has made any statement to the effect of giving fair and equitable treatment a meaning
different from the international minimum standard (let alone linking it to the 'legitimate
expectations' of investors and the stability of the legal environment for investment.)").
158 See Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade
Area,
c.
11,
art.
6(2)(c),
Feb.
27,
2009,
available
at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/chapters/chapterl1.html#fr6 ("[T]he concepts of 'fair
and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in
addition to or beyond that which is required under customary international law, and do
not create additional substantive rights."); Norway Draft Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, art. 5, 2007, available at http://italaw.com/investmenttreaties.htm (follow
Norway 2007 Draft Model BIT link) ("Each Party shall accord to investors of the other
Party, and their investments treatment in accordance with customary international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."); Columbia
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. III (4) (a), 2007, available at
http://italaw.com/documents/inv modelbit-colombia.pdf ("The concept[] of 'fair and
equitable treatment' . . . do[es] not require additional treatment to that required under the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens in accordance with the standard of customary
international law."); Canada Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5.2, 2004, available
at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf ("The concept... of
"fair and equitable treatment" . . . do[es] not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens."); U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5.2, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf (The concept... of
"fair and equitable treatment" . . . do[es] not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by [customary international law], and do[es] not create additional
substantive rights").

196

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. XXXVII

rights."'5 9 Accordingly, at least with regard to IIAs that explicitly
tie fair and equitable treatment to the customary international law
standard of protection, there does not appear to be a basis for an
international right-as a matter of either CIL or treaty law-to
compensation for regulatory measures based solely on their
adverse effects on the value of foreign investments.
Conclusion
V.
The use of investor-state arbitration procedures under IIAs has
accelerated dramatically: over half of known IIA arbitration cases
have been filed within the last 5 years.' 6 0 It seems likely that this
increase in investor-state arbitration will bring increased scrutiny
of the premise that IIAs-through both indirect expropriation and
fair and equitable treatment provisions-entitle foreign investors
to compensation for regulatory measures that have some requisite
level of adverse impact on their investments. The argument that
this standard of protection under IIAs merely reflects CIL growing
out of the general and consistent practice of states is not supported
by an examination of the actual practice of states with regard to
the protection of property from regulatory expropriations. There is
no general and consistent practice on this issue even among capital
exporting states that presumably share a strong interest in robust
standards of investor protection. Even those states that do
recognize a right to compensation for regulatory takings in their
domestic law tend to limit the right's application to certain types
of land use regulations.
Given the difficulty of demonstrating that foreign investors
enjoy a right to compensation for "regulatory expropriations" as a
matter of CIL, it seems likely that proponents of such a right
increasingly will attempt to establish its existence based on
159 Trade Protection Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Annex 10-B, Apr. 12, 2006, art. 10.5(2);
see also U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 158, at Annex A
[C]ustomary international law'. . . results from a general and consistent practice of
(."
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation."). This policy dates back to
2001, when the United States, Canada and Mexico adopted an interpretive statement
clarifying that NAFTA's minimum standard of treatment provision was intended to
reflect the CIL standard of protection. See Porterfield,supra note 29, at 91.
160 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note No. 1, U.N. Doe.
at
available
(2010),
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20103_en.pdf.
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alternative theories, delinking the relevant provisions of IIAs from
CIL, relying on them as a source of state practice, or elevating the
status of tribunal decisions to independent sources of international
law. Each of these approaches would require acceptance of a
significant role for arbitral tribunals not only in applying
international standards of investor protection but also in creating
and defining those standards. Whether such a role for tribunals
will be politically acceptable within the parties to HAs remains to
be seen.

